(This is Part 2 of a series. Go back to Part 1.)
In December, 1776 General George Washington, who was commanding the Revolutionary Army of the American colonies, was in desperate straits.
He had recently suffered three consecutive defeats from the British at the battles of Long Island, Harlem Heights and White Plains. Now he was forced to retreat with what remained of his demoralized army back to Pennsylvania.
Even worse than the physical defeats were the defeats to the morale of the Revolutionary cause. The nascent United States had no allies at this point. Foreign countries were afraid to stand against the powerful British unless the revolution seemed to have some chance to succeed.
Moreover, a good deal of Washington's bedraggled army had been lost at this point—from battle losses, from illness in the bitter cold, and also from steady desertions of the soldiers, who did not want to fight a losing cause.
Among the general public General Washington's reputation was now in tatters. And because Washington was the only thing holding the army together, the perception was beginning to form in the public mind that the American Revolution was a lost cause.
This in turn was having a very bad effect on the morale of the public and soldiers, on prospects for new enlistments in the spring, and on the the prospects for money from the bankrupt Continental Congress to keep going.
The whole idea of the American Revolution—the whole idea that a country could exist as a democratic republic, free from monarchial rule and its restrictions—was now a hair's breadth from disaster. If Washington now suffered a fourth defeat, the whole thing was lost.
At this point Washington followed the principle outlined in the previous article, that is, if you want to turn around a losing cause you begin by creating a series of small, do-able successes.
Meanwhile the British commander, General Clinton, had 30,000 troops stationed in a large semi-circle around New York City. Washington, in contrast, was down to a few thousand men who were subsisting in the bitter cold with little food and no pay.
Though he probably didn't think of it in these terms, Washington's challenge was that he now had to find some way to create a small success,—something small that would nevertheless have a high probability of victory and success.
In that era it was usual not to wage war in the winter because new soldiers could normally only be recruited in the spring and because the weather conditions were so harsh. Therefore, Washington knew he would have to attack in the winter to gain an element of surprise.
Secondly, he chose to attack not New York, the main fortress, but Trenton, New Jersey, at the southern end of the semi-circle. About two thousand Hessians, mercenaries hired by the British, were stationed there under Colonel Rall.
Third, Washington decided to attack on December 26, the day after Christmas. He calculated that the Hessians would be hung-over from almost two days of partying.
Then to increase the surprise and tactical advantage even further, Washington scheduled his attack at dawn. All these factors—of surprise, scale and timing—made it highly probable that this battle could be won.
On December 26th Washington set out before dawn with only 2400 men. This small force, in darkness and freezing sleet, made its way across the Delaware River, regrouped on the other side and attacked the Hessians.
The battle was a complete victory for the Revolutionary cause, not only because Washington and his troops were heartened but because the general public took heart.
Nevertheless Washington's situation was still very tenuous. He needed a second victory now to increase the momentum from the first. It needn't be a big victory, just a victory.
About a week later a large British force under General Cornwallis retook Trenton and, it being late, prepared to fight Washington's army the next day. That night, January 2, 1777, the British kept an eye on Washington's campfires in the distance. Then they attacked at dawn.
Whereupon the British soldiers discovered that Washington and his army had evacuated during the night and force-marched up to Princeton, NJ, where Washington made a successful attack upon the much smaller forces arrayed there.
Thus, though it was a small one, Washington again created a success. Interestingly, the effect of these small successes was out of all proportion to their size. It revitalized the public, put heart into the soldiers and the Congress, and led to the American victory at Saratoga later that year. And that paved the way for the major victory at Yorktown in 1781, the surrender of the British and American independence.
The successful American Revolution in turn inspired the French Revolution in 1789, enshrining the idea of political liberty—which had been brought back by French soldiers who served alongside the successful colonists in the Revolutionary War.
And these two revolutions ultimately led to the emergence of democratic republics all through Europe in the next century. Thus many things hinged on Washington's small victory in Trenton in 1776.
We can also utilize the principle that Washington used. If we're facing difficult times of any sort, or in any area, the thing to do is to find a way to create a small success, and build upon that with a string of small successes. This can remoralize a person, a relationship, a country, which then leads to larger successes.
For example, if we're having difficulty with our partner in a relationship, we can create some small forward momentum: We can say something nice about our partner, give them some flowers, make them a meal, etc. We can create a series of small successes, which then create an opening for larger successes—a dialogue with our partner, visits to a therapist, a vacation away togehter or whatever.
This same principle can be used in a relationship with our boss or children, to achieve a worthy goal, or in turning around a life—whether it be our personal life, the life of a nation, or even the life of an entire planet.
(This is the end of Part 2. Go to Part 3.)
—jim sloman, 5.31.03 for 10.10.03
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