(This is Part 7 of a series. Go back to Part 6.)
Mediocre generals, the ones who order disastrous frontal attacks against prepared defenders, seem to follow the dictum of "concentrating strength against strength."
But great generals know that this is folly. Instead they use a much different principle, exactly the opposite:
Concentrate strength against weakness.
Indeed, all great military strategy can be summed up in that one principle.
The great military strategist Sun Tzu in The Art of War put it this way: "Fight only when it is easy to win." He also said, "Act when you are sure of a favorable outcome."
But how do brilliant generals actually implement this principle in practice? Let's take a look:
There are twelve basic methods by which great generals concentrate strength against weakness. There is some overlap in the methods, but each is important:
1. Attack when the enemy is moving.
When the enemy is in a prepared position, he is ready for you. When he is moving from one place to another, on the other hand, he is in moving mode rather than battle mode. He cannot be as prepared for battle and thus is vulnerable to attack on the flanks created by his line of movement.
This principle of catching the enemy when he's in motion—rather than waiting for you behind prepared defenses—is even more true, of course, when the enemy's motion consists of a retreat, because then the motion is usually accompanied by some degree of disorder, making the enemy exceptionally vulnerable on his flanks and rear.
An outstanding example of this method was used by Hannibal in the Battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BC. By a brilliant maneuver, Hannibal had managed to get his army between Rome and the Roman army of General Flaminius.
As Flaminius and his army hurried toward Rome to protect it they had to pass along a road alongside Lake Trasimene. Hannibal hid troops in the hills above the road and simply attacked the Roman army on the flank as it passed by—which shattered Flaminius' army.
Another famous example is Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. As Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, the wily Russian General Kutusov simply retreated before him. After the Battle of Borodino, Kutusov knew he could not beat Napoleon in a pitched battle, so he simply continued to retreat before him.
In late September of 1812 Napoleon occupied a burned-out Moscow—over a thousand miles from Paris—and Kutusov and Czar Alexander still refused to negotiate. They simply waited. Kutusov knew that "General Winter" was coming, and that there were no supplies to be had in Moscow, so that sooner or later Napoleon would have to call a retreat.
Napoleon delayed, but finally began his retreat from Moscow on October 19th under sunny skies. Soon enough, though, the frigid Russian winter set in on the retreating army. And now Kutusov moved, attacking the retreating army on its flanks and rear. The French army basically disintegrated on its retreat back from Moscow.
In these examples we see the great power of attacking an opponent when he is moving. This sub-principle is used in aikido, juijitsu and other Oriental martial arts: When the opponent attacks he is on the move and therefore much more vulnerable. You sidestep the energy in one way or another, and then come in on the flank.
(This is the end of Part 7. Go to Part 8.)
—jim sloman, 8.19.03 for 5.2.04
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